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I. Introduction*
1.  Commentaries on access to evidence in competition 
cases generally start by stating that antitrust cases 
are “fact intensive,” and information relevant to the 
infringement and its effects on the market will often be 
distributed asymmetrically, with the infringer usually 
being in an advantaged position.1, 2
*  This introduction is largely based on, and reproduces some sections of, F. Wagner-von 
Papp, Access to Evidence and Leniency Materials (February 18, 2016), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2733973.
1 Recitals 14 and 15 of  the Damages Directive 2014/104/EU; Commission White Paper on 
Damages Actions for Breach of  the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2008) 165 final of  2 April 
2008 (the “White Paper”) 4–5; Commission Staff  Working Paper accompanying the 
White Paper, SEC(2008) 404 of  2 April 2008 (the “Commission Staff  Working Paper”) 
para. 65–66; A. Bruns, Private Enforcement of  Competition Law: Evidence, in J. Basedow, 
J. P. Terhechte and L. Tichý (eds.), Private Enforcement of  Competition Law (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos 2011) 127, 130; G. Bauer and K. Kitzberger, Production of  Evidence in Central 
and Eastern Europe, in J. Basedow, J. P. Terhechte and L. Tichý (eds.), op. cit., 153, 154; 
J.  A. Sanner, Informationsgewinnung und Schutz von Unternehmensgeheimnissen in der 
privaten Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2014) 150, 184–96.
2 I assume in the following the standard situation in which the information asymmetry is 
in favour of  the infringer. In other situations, the asymmetry may be in favour of  the 
injured party, for example in relation to the pass-on of  overcharges (see also the second 
sentence of  Article 13 and Article 14(1) of  the Directive). The Damages Directive provides 
for the possibility of  two-way disclosure (first and second sentence of  Article 5(1) of  the 
Directive, respectively), including disclosure from third parties. The issues to be consid-
ered need not be mirror images, however. A German court considered, for example, that 
the infringer may be sued by indirect and direct purchasers concurrently or successively. In 
such a case, the indirect purchasers will supply the infringer with evidence of  pass-on, so 
that the infringer may not depend on disclosure of  information by the direct purchasers 
to the same degree as purchasers who seek disclosure from the infringer. Federal Court of  
Justice (BGH), 28 June 2011, KZR 75/10 – ORWI para. 72. 
2.  Legal systems can address this disadvantage in 
several ways. They can presume the fact in favour of the 
injured party, either by reversing the burden of proof 
by establishing rebuttable or irrefutable presumptions, 
or they can leave the burden of proof formally with the 
disadvantaged party but require the party in possession 
of the information to bear a burden of production (e.g., 
evidential presumptions in the common law, or abgestufte 
Darlegungs- und Beweislast in German law). Or, and this 
is the topic with which we are concerned here, they can 
establish an obligation on the duty in possession of the 
information to disclose it to the other party. 
3.  Such obligations to disclose can be established as 
substantive or procedural obligations and are known to a 
greater or lesser extent in all legal systems.3 However, the 
preparatory work for the Damages Directive showed that 
in particular in the EU’s civil law jurisdictions, claimants 
had difficulties getting access to the information they 
needed to substantiate their claims. In Europe, a party 
does not have a right to demand disclosure; it is for the 
court to order it. Traditionally, in civil law jurisdictions 
the court could only order disclosure if  either the 
requested party had referred to the piece of evidence 
or the requesting party had a substantive claim to it. 
3 For a comparative overview, see in particular B. Rodger, Institutions and Mechanisms to 
Facilitate Private Enforcement, in B. Rodger (ed), Competition Law Comparative Private 
Enforcement and Collective Redress across the EU (Aalphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International 2014) § 2.04, pp 43–59; see also F. Wagner-von Papp, Access to Evidence 
and Leniency Materials (February 18, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2733973, Part 
III; and of  course the contributions below.
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AbstrAct
Article 5 of the Damages Directive requires Member States to enable 
courts to order disclosure of evidence under certain qualifying conditions, 
while protecting the rights of parties and third parties, in particular confidential 
information. This is an area in which common law jurisdictions and civil 
law jurisdictions tend to differ substantially. The contributions discuss 
how the Member States have implemented the provisions in the Damages 
Directive on disclosure, and to what extent the Damages Directive will result 
in a harmonisation of the practice in the courts in the Member States. 
En application de l’article 5 de la Directive 2014/104/UE, les États membres veillent 
à ce que les juridictions nationales puissent ordonner la production de certains 
éléments de preuves ou de catégories pertinentes de preuves dans certaines 
conditions tout en protégeant les droits des parties et des tiers, en particulier 
des informations confidentielles. Il s’agit d’un domaine dans lequel les Etats 
de common law et les Etats de droit continental adoptent des solutions assez 
diffiérentes. Les contributions font état de la manière dont les les dispositions 
de la directive ont été transposées dans 5 Etats membres. Elles s’interrogent 
également sur le point de savoir s’il peut en resulter une harmonisation 
de la pratique devant les tribunaux des États membres.
Disclosure of documents that 
lie in the control of the parties
C
e 
do
cu
m
en
t e
st
 p
ro
té
gé
 a
u 
tit
re
 d
u 
dr
oi
t d
'a
ut
eu
r p
ar
 le
s 
co
nv
en
tio
ns
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
le
s 
en
 v
ig
ue
ur
 e
t l
e 
C
od
e 
de
 la
 p
ro
pr
ié
té
 in
te
lle
ct
ue
lle
 d
u 
1e
r j
ui
lle
t 1
99
2.
 T
ou
te
 u
til
is
at
io
n 
no
n 
au
to
ris
ée
 c
on
st
itu
e 
un
e 
co
nt
re
fa
ço
n,
 d
él
it 
pé
na
le
m
en
t s
an
ct
io
nn
é 
ju
sq
u'
à 
3 
an
s 
d'
em
pr
is
on
ne
m
en
t e
t 3
00
 0
00
 €
 d
'a
m
en
de
 (a
rt
. 
L.
 3
35
-2
 C
PI
). 
L’
ut
ili
sa
tio
n 
pe
rs
on
ne
lle
 e
st
 s
tri
ct
em
en
t a
ut
or
is
ée
 d
an
s 
le
s 
lim
ite
s 
de
 l’
ar
tic
le
 L
. 1
22
 5
 C
PI
 e
t d
es
 m
es
ur
es
 te
ch
ni
qu
es
 d
e 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
po
uv
an
t a
cc
om
pa
gn
er
 c
e 
do
cu
m
en
t. 
Th
is
 d
oc
um
en
t i
s 
pr
ot
ec
te
d 
by
 c
op
yr
ig
ht
 la
w
s 
an
d 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l c
op
yr
ig
ht
 tr
ea
tie
s.
 N
on
-a
ut
ho
ris
ed
 u
se
 o
f t
hi
s 
do
cu
m
en
t 
co
ns
tit
ut
es
 a
 v
io
la
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
pu
bl
is
he
r's
 ri
gh
ts
 a
nd
 m
ay
 b
e 
pu
ni
sh
ed
 b
y 
up
 to
 3
 y
ea
rs
 im
pr
is
on
m
en
t a
nd
 u
p 
to
 a
 €
 3
00
 0
00
 fi
ne
 (A
rt
. L
. 3
35
-2
 C
od
e 
de
 la
 P
ro
pr
ié
té
 In
te
lle
ct
ue
lle
). 
Pe
rs
on
al
 u
se
 o
f t
hi
s 
do
cu
m
en
t i
s 
au
th
or
is
ed
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
lim
its
 o
f A
rt
. L
 1
22
-5
 C
od
e 
de
 la
 P
ro
pr
ié
té
 In
te
lle
ct
ue
lle
 a
nd
 D
R
M
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n.
Concurrences N° 3-2017 I Conference I 5 May 2017, Würzburg 13
While many civil law jurisdictions have relaxed this 
position to allow the court to order disclosure in a wider 
range of situations,4 it remains in the court’s discretion 
whether disclosure is ordered, and in most civil law 
jurisdictions courts continue to apply a very strict test of 
proportionality. Most civil law jurisdictions traditionally 
require a relatively precise specification of an item of 
evidence before a court will order its disclosure, and many 
jurisdictions do not allow for ordering the disclosure of 
entire categories of evidence.
4. A starting point in the drafting of the Directive was 
the model of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP) in the United States. At the same 
time, however, the “excesses” of the US system were to 
be avoided.5 These “excesses” result in very high costs 
of discovery, and can lead to “discovery abuse” and 
“discovery blackmail.”6 Since the 1980s, the US has 
attempted to rein in these excesses in various reforms 
of the FRCP. Economic analyses usually identify as the 
main reason for the excessively high costs the “American 
cost rule”, according to which it is usually the requested 
party that has to bear the costs, so that these costs are 
externalities for the requesting party, thus providing 
an incentive for the requesting party to leave no stone 
unturned.7 But, as the English experience shows, even 
under the European cost rules disclosure may become 
a costly exercise if  all relevant information is to be 
disclosed (possibly because of cross-party agency costs, 
partly because of information asymmetries between 
lawyers and their clients).8
5.  The resulting compromise is contained in Article  5 
of the Damages Directive. Article  5 requires Member 
States to enable courts to order disclosure under certain 
conditions. Even if  all the conditions of Article  5 are 
fulfilled—the reasoned justification, relevance of the 
evidence, the requested party being in control of the 
evidence, sufficient specification of pieces of evidence 
and circumscription of categories of evidence, and 
proportionality—Article 5 of the Directive still does not 
4 E.g., the French legislator reformed the Code of  Civil Procedure in the 1970s to introduce 
Article 11, 138–42 nouveau code de procédure civile (ncpc); Germany introduced §§ 142, 
144 Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO, Civil Procedure Code) in 2001 (Gesetz zur Reform des 
Zivilprozesses of  27 July 2001 (2001) Bundesgesetzblatt Part I, no 40, 1887). 
5 Commission Staff  Working Paper, No. 1, para. 93–97.
6 Bell Atlantic v Twombly, 550 US 544, 558–559 (2007) (stating that ‘the threat of  
discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases [...]’); 
F.H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, Boston University Law Review 69 (1989) 635–648; 
see also, from an economics perspective, R.D. Cooter & D.L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the 
New Discovery Rules, Georgetown Law Journal 84 (1995) 61–89; R.D. Cooter & T. Ulen, 
Law & Economics, 6th International edn (Boston: Pearson 2012) 398. 
7 B.H. Kobayashi, Law’s Information Revolution as Procedural Reform: Predictive Search 
as a Solution to the in Terrorem Effect of  Externalized Discovery Costs, University of  
Illinois Law Review 2014, 1473, 1476–1477 (with references in fn 15); R.D. Cooter & D.L. 
Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of  Legal Discovery, Journal of  Legal Studies 23 (1994), 
435, 452–454, 455–459; F.H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, Boston University Law 
Review 69 (1989) 635, 645–648; A.B. Spencer, Rationalizing Cost Allocation in Civil 
Discovery (January 29, 2015), Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No 6, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2557613. 
8 For more detail see F. Wagner-von Papp, Access to Evidence and Leniency Materials 
(February 18, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2733973, Part II, and B.H. Kobayashi, 
Law’s Information Revolution as Procedural Reform: Predictive Search as a Solution to 
the in Terrorem Effect of  Externalized Discovery Costs, University of  Illinois Law Review 
2014, 1473.
compel the Member States to require the court to order 
disclosure; Member States must merely enable courts to 
order disclosure.9 In other words, under the Directive there 
is no express requirement that the claimant must have a 
right to disclosure, although Recital 15 of the Directive 
still considers it “appropriate to ensure that claimants are 
afforded the right [sic] to obtain the disclosure of evidence 
relevant to their claim.”
6.  As I had already pointed out in relation to the 
corresponding provision in the 2009 Kroes draft 
directive,10 such a provision merely enabling courts to 
order disclosure is unlikely to change the traditional 
position in the Member States drastically, because most 
Member States already enable courts to order disclosure. 
Indeed, for the most part Member States do not have 
to modify their laws to comply with Article 5 of the 
Directive. Even though the law in action in Member 
States such as Germany, France, or Italy differs quite 
substantially from the law in the United Kingdom, the 
national provisions in these Member States already 
complied (fully or largely) with the minimum standard 
provided for in Article 5 of the Directive. In other words, 
the “harmonisation” sought by the Directive will not 
come about solely through the implementation of the 
provisions of the Directive. One aspect that may require 
action by some Member States is that they need to clarify 
that a court must be able not only to disclose specific 
pieces of evidence, but also entire categories of evidence. 
To be sure, this is not an insignificant detail; but whether 
this change will have a practical effect depends on the 
willingness of national judges to make use of this power.
7. To the extent experience is a guide, there is not much 
hope that the cultural predisposition of judges will 
be swayed substantially by modifications to the rules 
where these rules do not require change, but merely 
seek to “nudge” judges into changing their attitude 
toward disclosure. In the United States and in the UK, 
the traditionally broad and costly disclosure has led 
to numerous reforms of the disclosure rules to suggest 
more active control and containment of disclosure by the 
court in order to ensure the proportionality of disclosure 
requests (various reforms of the FRCP since the 1980s 
in the US; the Woolf and Jackson Reforms in the UK).11 
It is widely acknowledged that courts in the US and 
the UK have by and large stuck with their engrained 
preference toward granting broad disclosure. Conversely, 
as noted above, civil law jurisdictions have introduced 
more discretion for judges to order disclosure; but again, 
courts have by and large not deviated to a significant 
extent from their traditionally conservative approach to 
disclosure. 
9 The wording of  the proposal for the Directive suggested otherwise.
10 F. Wagner-von Papp, Der Richtlinienentwurf  zu kartellrechtlichen Schadensersatzklagen, 
Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht 2009, 445, 452.
11 For more detail see F. Wagner-von Papp, Access to Evidence and Leniency Materials 
(February 18, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2733973, Part III. Ce
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8.  This is not to say that the Damages Directive is 
incapable of leading to substantial changes with regard 
to disclosure inter partes. First, Member States may take 
the Damages Directive as an opportunity to go beyond 
the minimum requirements of the Directive and to gold-
plate the implementation provisions (see Article 5(8) of 
the Directive); indeed, Germany has taken this path.12 
Second, the Court of Justice in Laboratoires Boiron held 
that under the principle of effectiveness “the national 
court is required to use all procedures available to it under 
national law, including that of ordering the necessary 
measures of inquiry, in particular the production by one of 
the parties or a third party of a particular document.”13 
The Damages Directive now ensures that all courts 
have, as a “procedure[] available to it,” the ability to 
order disclosure. Even though the obligation under 
Laboratoires Boiron should have been observed even in 
the absence of such a European provision on disclosure 
where national provisions previously existed, it has now 
become more likely that parties will refer to the principle 
of effectiveness in order to transform the mere power to 
order disclosure in the hand of the judges to an obligation 
to order disclosure. This combination of Article 5 of the 
Directive with the Laboratoires Boiron judgment could 
well lead to a change not only in the law in the books but 
also the law in action.
9. The interpretation of Article 5 of the Directive raises 
numerous issues. Is a requested party “in the control” of 
evidence if  the evidence is with a parent or a subsidiary—
does the concept of the single economic unit apply? 
Is the party in control if  the evidence is located on its 
employees’ devices used under a “bring-your-own device” 
policy? How is the proportionality test to be applied? 
Many of the practically important questions—such 
as cost-allocation rules, and to what extent disclosure 
obligations exist outside the main action for damages—
are left to the national implementation. 
10.  Florian Bien, as the organiser of the event in 
Würzburg, has assembled an outstanding panel of 
contributors to report on the national implementation of 
the Directive. Given the likely departure of the UK from 
the EU, he understandably did not use the same diligence 
in picking a reporter for that jurisdiction.
F. W.-v. P.
12 See J. Bernhard’s contribution on Germany below.
13 Judgment of  the Court (Second Chamber) of  7 September 2006 in Case  526/04 
(Laboratoires Boiron SA v. Union de recouvrement des cotisations de sécurité sociale et 
d’allocations familiales (Urssaf) de Lyon), ECLI:EU:C:2006:528, para. 57.
II. France
11.  There is no procedure of discovery in French law, 
but the French judge has already the power to order a 
party to disclose relevant evidence, not only during 
the litigation14 but also in a pre-litigation situation15. 
These rules have already been applied in antitrust cases. 
The most famous cases did not concern cartel cases, 
but presumed abuses of dominant positions following 
commitment decisions. The main obstacle was a penal 
provision16, which prevents a party to use a document 
obtained via proceedings before the French Competition 
Authority. However, the French Civil Supreme Court17 
accepted production of such documents if  it is necessary 
to preserve the rights of defence18. 
12.  These rather broad powers of the judge in a 
continental legal system explain that the new French 
provisions are rather limited. There are included in the 
Chapter  III of the new Title  VIII on damages action, 
which is divided in three sections. The first one on general 
provisions contains a single article—the new Article 
L.  483-1 Commercial Code—shorter than Article  5 of 
the Directive. The second section deals with the specific 
issue of the protection of business secrets19. The third 
section is devoted to the access of evidence in the file 
of the Competition Authority20. The Decree, of course, 
follows the same divisions, but it also contains the rules on 
penalties21 to be in line with the requirements of Article 8 
of the Directive. However, the maximal amount of the 
fine is rather limited: €10,000. Furthermore, the penal 
prohibition of using information obtained in previous 
competition proceedings does not apply anymore in 
damages action22.
This specific part of the reform is applicable to all actions 
introduced after December 26, 2014. 
Two series of remarks can be made: first, on the general 
system of disclosure, second, on the protection of 
business secrets, which is the main innovation of the 
French implementation.
14 Art. 138 Civil Procedure Code.
15 Art. 145 Civil Procedure Code.
16 Art. L. 463-6 Commercial Code.
17 Cass. Com., 19 January 2010, Semavem v. JVC France, Concurrences No.  2-2010, obs. 
C. L., S. N.
18 For a general presentation of  the former French system, L. Idot and F. Zivy, L’accès au 
dossier des autorités de concurrence dans le cadre des actions privées : État des lieux deux 
ans après l’arrêt Pfleiderer, Concurrences, No. 3-2013, pp. 34-53.
19 Art. L. 482-2 and L. 483-3 Commercial Code.
20 See infra.
21 Art. R. 483-14 Commercial Code; Art. R. 775-15 Administrative Justice Code.
22 Art. L. 463-6, para. 2, Commercial Code. Ce
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1. The general system 
of disclosure*
13. The first provision contains a referral to the ordinary 
rules of procedure, either civil or administrative depending 
on the judge who has jurisdiction23. Accordingly, it can 
be said that France has opted for procedural disclosure 
rules. These ordinary procedural rules will apply on 
most issues since the new special rules introduced in the 
Commercial Code are rather limited. They concern both 
the request for disclosure and the powers of the judge.
1.1 Request for disclosure
14.  As far as the admissibility of the request is 
concerned, the French requirement seems to be lighter 
than Directive’s Article  5.1: “(…) the claimant who has 
presented a reasoned justification containing reasonably 
available facts and evidence sufficient to support the 
plausibility of a claim for damages”. In French law, the 
claimant is only requested to invoke a plausible harm 
following an anticompetitive practice. 
15.  To our knowledge, there was no specific debate 
on some Directive’s elements such as “relevance” or 
“control”, which are useful to delineate the object of 
the request. Many discussions occurred rather on the 
implementation of Directive’s Article  5.2 and on the 
meaning of “relevant categories of evidence”. In practice, 
the judges may already order to produce categories of 
evidence, which are rather broadly defined. Though, a 
new provision has been inserted in the Decree24, which 
could produce some restrictive effects since it is specified 
that the categories of evidence shall be identified in a 
precise way through common characteristics (such as 
nature, object, content of pieces…).
1.2 Powers of the judge
16.  The general principle of proportionality expressed 
in Directive’s Article  5.3 is transposed in the general 
provision of Article L. 483-1, paragraph 2. It is only said 
that the judge shall consider the legitimate interests of 
both parties and third parties taking into consideration 
four elements which can be balanced: effectiveness of 
damages action versus efficiency of public enforcement, 
usefulness of pieces of evidence versus protection of 
confidential information.
It is maybe the main point of the French reform. So far, 
no protection of confidential information was organised 
before ordinary courts. It is no more the case.
*  Art. L. 483-1, Art. R. 483-1 Commercial Code.
23 Art. L. 483-1, para. 1, in fine, Commercial Code.
24 Art. R. 483-1 Commercial Code.
** Art. L. 483-2, L. 483-3; R. 483-2 to R. 483-10 Commercial Code; Art. R. 775-4 
to 775-11 Administrative Justice Code.
2. The protection of business 
secrets before ordinary courts** 
17.  Directive’s Article  5.4 raised some issues in France 
due to the lack of protection of confidential information. 
So far, unlike the proceedings before the Competition 
Authority, everything is public (hearing, final decision) 
in proceedings before ordinary courts. Only the 
Paris Commercial Court began to organise a specific 
protection, but in a full informal way. In the meantime, 
the Directive 2016/943/EU of the 8th of June 2016 on the 
protection of business information was adopted. Article 9 
of this text requires a preservation of the confidentiality 
of trade secrets in the course of legal proceedings. 
Therefore, the Ministry of Justice considered that it was 
possible to anticipate the full implementation of this 
directive in the new provisions. 
18.  According to the new system, the judge keeps the 
power to order the production of pieces containing 
business secrets, but a protection is now laid down. It 
applies both to parties and to third parties. The definition 
of what is a business secret is not given, but the French 
judges will probably follow the EU competition case law.
If  the holder of the piece of evidence requires a 
protection for this piece, the procedure is very close to 
that organised for the protection of business secrets 
before the Competition Authority: 
–  The holder of the piece shall prepare a 
non-confidential version;
– The judge, who has always a full access to the piece, 
decides, whether or not, it shall be produced taking 
into consideration first the content of the piece 
(does it, or not, contain any business secret?). If it 
is deemed to be a business secret, the judge has to 
balance this fact with the usefulness of the document 
and the rights of defence of the other parties; 
– If  it is a business secret, to which access (fully or 
only partially) shall be given, the judge organises 
the rules for submitting such document (data 
room; huis clos…; limited circle);
–  The order of production can be immediately 
reviewed either by the president of the Paris Court 
of Appeals (or Administrative Court of Appeals), 
then, if  necessary, an appeal in cassation may be 
introduced before the Supreme Court.
A non-confidential version of the final decision is 
established if  necessary.
All persons who have access to business secrets are bound 
by an obligation of confidentiality (Art. L. 483-3 Com. 
C.). However, the penal prohibition of Article L. 463-6 
Commercial Code is no more applicable. 
19.  These new provisions cannot be considered as 
the general transposition of Directive  2016/943/EU’s 
Article 9, but the antitrust field will probably be used as a 
reference in the next texts of transposition.
L. I.
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III. Germany
20. Prior to the adoption of the EU Antitrust Damages 
Directive, the German legislature had taken a clear stance: 
“In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, there is 
no need for any fundamental decision, such as the EU-wide 
introduction of discovery proceedings into continental 
European civil procedure.”25 In view of this, it is all the 
more surprising that the German legislator then, in 
Section 33g of the Act against Restraints of Competition 
(Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, GWB) set 
forth a separate right to the disclosure of information 
and surrender of documents for the parties to antitrust 
damages actions that goes even above and beyond the 
transposition of the Antitrust Damages Directive. 
Pursuant to Section 89c (5) GWB, the claim to surrender 
and disclosure inter partes takes precedence over the 
inspection of files by the antitrust authorities. Thus, the 
new legislation first and foremost shifts the investigation 
efforts from the German Federal Cartel Authority 
(Bundeskartellamt) to the parties to civil law actions and 
the courts involved in such actions. 
1. Entitlement to claims
21.  Any party that can credibly demonstrate that they 
have a claim to antitrust damages has a right to the 
disclosure and surrender of information during and 
prior to an action for antitrust damages pursuant to 
Section 33g(1), (10) in conjunction with Section 89b(5) 
GWB. Following the case law of the German Federal 
Court in the ORWI26 case and the ECJ in the Courage27 
case, this applies equally to those directly and indirectly 
affected by a cartel. Interpreting the provision in line 
with EU law, the requirement to provide credible 
evidence pursuant to Article  5(1), sentence  1, of the 
Antitrust Damages Directive  2014/104/EU requires 
merely a reasoned justification of the damage caused by 
the cartel.28 Pursuant to Section 294(1) German Code 
of Civil Procedure (ZPO), an affidavit, for instance 
concerning the purchase of a product from a company 
involved in the cartel during the relevant period, is 
sufficient. According to the principles of prima facie 
evidence applied by German courts in this context, 
the purchase of a product covered by the cartel on the 
relevant product market from a cartelist during the cartel 
period leads to a rebuttable presumption that the cartel 
25 Statement of  the Federal Ministry for the Economy and Technology, the Federal Ministry 
of  Justice, the Federal Ministry of  Food and Agriculture and the Federal Cartel Office on 
the European Commission’s White Paper, Damages Actions for Breach of  the EC Antitrust 
Rules, of  14 July 2008, p. 7. 
26 BGH, judgment of  28 June 2011, File Ref. KZR 75/10 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
2012, 928 – ORWI.
27 ECJ, judgment of  20 September 2001, Case C-453/99, ECR 2001, I-6297 – Courage.
28 A. Rosenfeld and P. Brandt, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, 2017, 247, 249; A.  Bach and 
C. Wolf, Neue Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht, 2017, 285, 288.
caused harm to the purchaser.29 The principles governing 
prima facie evidence merely require a typical sequence 
of events, i.e., there must be circumstances which, in 
line with general life experience, indicate a certain 
cause or a certain sequence of events as decisive for the 
occurrence of a specific outcome.30 In the context of this 
reduced standard of proof, it is likely that in particular 
the assertion of antitrust damages based on low-value 
damages will become more straightforward. So  far, 
it was nearly impossible to enforce such claims, since 
there typically remains nearly no evidence in the form 
of till receipts or similar documents for mass everyday 
transactions involving foodstuffs or consumer goods, 
even after only a short period. If  such means of evidence 
may be replaced by an affidavit, the reduced evidentiary 
requirements are likely to encourage at least the bundling 
of claims with respect to low-value damages by means 
of assignment to a claimant pursuant to Section 398 of 
the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB). 
22.  Conversely, the alleged injuring party also has a 
right to disclosure and surrender of information, but 
this right exists only from such time as an action is 
pending. The reduced standard of proof does not apply 
in this context. If  the injuring party lodges an action for 
negative declaratory judgment, it is not permitted to deny 
in this context its involvement in the breach of antitrust 
law. Otherwise, it would lose its claim to disclosure and 
surrender of information pursuant to Section 33g(2), 
sentence 2, GWB. 
2. Defendant
23.  As well as the cartelists, third parties that are in 
possession of evidence can also be the defendants in a 
claim to the disclosure and surrender of information. 
Which facts the claimant must furnish in order to 
demonstrate that the defendant is “in possession of 
evidence” is not clear from the explanatory memorandum 
of the German legislator. However, due to the claimant’s 
lack of opportunity to inspect information as to 
ownership, the requirements cannot be too stringent here 
either. The plausible demonstration by the claimant that 
a typical sequence of events leads to the conclusion that, 
based on experience, an individual or a legal entity is in 
possession of certain evidence is likely to be sufficient.31
29 Higher Regional Court (OLG) Karlsruhe, judgment of  9 November 2016, File Ref. 6 U 
204/15 Kart (2) = Neue Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht, 2016, 595, 597 – Grauzement; OLG 
Thüringen, judgment of  22 February 2017, File Ref. 2 U 583/15 Kart, margin note 68 
and 69 = Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2017, 203 – Gleisoberbaumaterialien. 
30 BGH, judgment of  5 February 1987, File Ref. I ZR 210/84 = Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1987, 2876, 2877. 
31 To overcome difficulties in the provision of  evidence, the Federal Court assumes, for 
instance, also in the case of  the wrongful use of  a debit card using the original card that, 
based on general experience, the cardholder was at the time of  the withdrawal himself  in 
possession of  the card or had kept it together with the PIN such that a third party could 
make a withdrawal (BGH, judgment of  29 November 2011, File Ref. XI ZR 370/10 = 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2012, 1277, 1278). Ce
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3. Identification of evidence
24. Pursuant to Section 33g(1) GWB, the disclosure of 
the evidence must be “necessary” for the assertion of 
the antitrust damages claim. The criterion of necessity 
is stricter than the wording of “relevance” set forth in 
Article  5(1) Antitrust Damages Directive. The term is 
therefore likely to be interpreted in line with the Directive 
such that the suitability of evidence to substantiate 
part of the claim to antitrust damages will already be 
sufficient. 
25.  In addition, the evidence must be described as 
precisely as possible, based on the available facts and 
using reasonable effort. Pursuant to an interpretation 
in line with the Directive and in light of Article  5(2) 
of the Antitrust Damages Directive, the description 
of categories of evidence must suffice for a suitably 
precise description. Which degree of precision is 
deemed reasonable is measured first and foremost 
based on whether the entitled claimant is aware of the 
existence and content of the evidence or ought to have 
been aware thereof according to Section  122(2) BGB. 
If  this is the case, a precise description should also be 
requested. If  the potential victims of a cartel are unaware 
of the existence of or the contents of evidence due to 
information asymmetry, it is likely to be sufficient for 
them to comprehensively describe the evidence in terms 
of categories, for example, with reference to “all internal 
e-mails concerning contact with the companies A, B 
and C that participated in the cartel,” or to “all invoices 
concerning supplies of the product X during the period 
Y to the company Z.”32 What is relevant is solely that it 
is unequivocally clear for the party required to disclose 
information precisely which information is required of 
it.33
4. Proportionality of the 
request for disclosure or 
surrender of information
26.  Pursuant to Section 33g(3), (10) GWB, the claim 
to disclosure and surrender of information can be 
successfully asserted only if  the disclosure of the evidence 
is proportional. According to the general principles of 
German civil procedural law, the burden of proof and 
provision of evidence of disproportionality is borne by 
the defendant, since it relates to a negative fact that is 
beneficial to it.34 Pursuant to Section 33g(3), sentence 2 
No.  1 to 6, GWB, when reviewing the proportionality, 
particular consideration is to be given to the scope of 
the claim, the costs associated with the disclosure, the 
relevance of the requested evidence for the antitrust 
damages proceedings, whether the reference to an item of 
32 R. Podszun and S. Kreifels, Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftrecht, 2017, 67, 68; B. Kreße, 
Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis, 2016, 567, 573; A. Bach and C. Wolf, Neue Zeitschrift für 
Kartellrecht, 2017, 285, 289.
33 Draft bill of  1 July 2016, p. 62. 
34 U. Foerste, in: H. J. Musielak and W. Voit, ZPO, 14th edition 2017, margin note 35.
evidence is obsolete based on the court being bound by a 
decision of the cartel authorities, whether the effectiveness 
of public enforcement of antitrust law would be limited 
and whether business or trade secrets are affected. In 
this context, the criterion of the costs of disclosure is 
to be interpreted restrictively, since the defendant party 
pursuant to Section 33g(7) GWB is in any case entitled 
to reimbursement of the costs incurred by it. Ultimately, 
in addition to the review of necessity pursuant to Section 
33g(1) GWB, the courts will be unable to avoid carrying 
out a proportionality review for each item of evidence 
pursuant to Section 33g(3) GWB. 
5. Restriction of the claim 
to disclosure or surrender of 
information to court inspection 
of leniency applications and 
settlement submissions
27.  Section  33g(4), (10) GWB excludes the disclosure 
of leniency applications and settlement submissions to 
potential claimants, insofar as the information contained 
therein is not available in any case irrespective of any 
cartel authority proceedings. However, if  the disclosure 
between the parties of the leniency application or the 
settlement submissions is excluded, the claimant can, 
pursuant to Section 33g(4), sentence  3, GWB, demand 
the disclosure of the information to the court competent 
for the antitrust damages claim, without itself  having 
a right to inspection. Based on the principle of party 
disposition in German civil procedural law, a claimant 
normally continues to be required to provide evidence 
and bears the burden of proof with respect to the facts 
contained in a leniency application and settlement 
submissions. If, however, it cites the leniency application 
and settlement submissions as evidence, a court that 
received these statements directly from the alleged 
infringer will certainly also include this information in its 
consideration of the evidence.
6. General exclusion of the 
claim to disclosure or surrender 
of information with regard to 
documents provided specifically 
for cartel proceedings
28. Prior to the conclusion of proceedings by the cartel 
authorities against all those involved, the disclosure of 
evidence and the respective surrender of information is 
generally excluded in Section  33g(5), (10) GWB in so 
far as it concerns information provided specifically for 
the cartel proceedings outside the leniency application, 
notices by the cartel authorities to the parties to the 
proceedings or withdrawn settlement submissions. After 
conclusion of the cartel proceedings, i.e., in case of 
follow-on damages claims, disclosure of those pieces of 
evidence may, however, be claimed by the parties. Ce
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29. Furthermore, pursuant to Section 33g(6) GWB, the 
disclosure of evidence held by parties entitled to refuse 
testimony, such as, in particular, lawyers, is generally 
excluded. It is unclear whether this exclusion criterion 
also applies to correspondence relating to the filing 
of or defence against antitrust damages actions. An 
interpretation in light of Section  383(1) No.  6 of the 
German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung, 
ZPO) supports the view that all communications with 
lawyers are excluded from the disclosure obligation.35 
However, in particular in the case of an intentional 
transfer of evidence to the lawyer, this extensive exclusion 
appears incompatible with the European law principle of 
effectiveness.
7. Legal consequences
30.  If  the defendant intentionally or grossly negligently 
discloses incorrect or incomplete evidence or provides 
incomplete information, he is liable to pay compensation 
to the claimant pursuant to Section 33g(8) GWB. In 
contrast, under German law, the defendant is not liable to 
payment of a fine. In view of the fact that damage caused 
by refusal to disclose or surrender information is likely 
to be very difficult to prove, it is by all means conceivable 
that a large proportion of the claims to disclosure and 
provision of information will prove fruitless due to the 
defendant’s refusal to provide information.
31. By contrast, if  the defendant discloses or surrenders 
evidence or information, he is entitled to claim 
reimbursement of the expenses incurred in the disclosure 
pursuant to Section 33g(7) GWB. This claim to the 
reimbursement of expenses applies irrespective of the 
provisions on the allocation of costs set forth in Section 91 
ZPO, pursuant to which the unsuccessful party must bear 
the costs of the action. It is questionable whether the 
German legislator thought through the consequences of 
this provision. It could result in the odd outcome that a 
court allows an action for the disclosure and provision 
of information in full and orders the respondent to pay 
the costs, but the respondent subsequently has a claim 
to reimbursement of expenses in an amount far higher 
than the claimant’s original claim. However, if  the court 
were to allow the respondent’s claim to reimbursement, 
the claimant could subsequently assert the amount of 
the claim to reimbursement as another item in the action 
for antitrust damages, since his obligation to reimburse 
expenses would not have existed, were it not for the 
respondent’s infringement of antitrust law.
J. B.
35 Official Bundestag Publication 18/102007, p. 63; A. Bach and C. Wolf, Neue Zeitschrift für 
Kartellrecht, 2017, 285, 290.
IV. Italy
32. Article 5 of the EU Directive 2014/104 has been fully 
implemented by the national legislature. Notwithstanding 
the enthusiasm of some scholars or, on the opposite 
side, the fears of others, it is well accepted that, like the 
corresponding provision in the Directive,36 Article  3 of 
the Legislative Decree No. 3/17 has nothing to do with the 
US style pre-trial discovery or even with UK disclosure 
techniques. Although the Directive allowed national law 
to preserve or introduce higher standards of disclosure, 
Article  3 of the Decree simply translates the Directive 
almost word for word. In addition, even some of the 
Recitals have been transposed into national law. The 
outcome is a special and to a certain extent more effective 
form of the “esibizione di documenti” in Article  210 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure (c.p.c.). Meaningfully, 
the Decree translates “disclosure” with the Italian 
“esibizione” and the Explanatory Report accompanying 
the scheme of Legislative Decree (from now on, “the 
Report”) insists on the need to coordinate the rationale 
behind the Directive and the common requirements of 
Article 210 c.p.c. In the following overview, I will point 
out the major changes to the status quo. 
1. Disclosure of relevant 
categories of evidence
33.  Pursuant to Article 210 c.p.c.,37 disclosure can be 
granted, on application by the parties, if  it is “necessary” 
(i.e., documents, the disclosure thereof is sought, are 
potentially useful to prove specific and previously 
asserted facts relevant to the case) and “indispensable” 
(both in the sense that the applicant cannot get the 
document by different means and, according to the most 
stringent case law, also in the sense that the facts, to 
which the document refers, cannot be proved by different 
means). Moreover, according to the traditional strict 
construction of Articles 210 c.p.c. and 94 regio decreto 
No. 1368/1941 (provisions for the implementation of the 
c.p.c.) only disclosure of precisely identified documents 
can be granted, provided that the applicant describes 
the content thereof and offers evidence, when necessary, 
that the documents exist and lie in the control of the 
addressee of the order. Finally, disclosure is precluded 
if  it forces the addressee to breach professional secrets 
or if  it causes “grave danno” (serious harm) to the 
addressee. Comparing Article  3 of the Decree and the 
aforementioned provisions, differences and similarities 
can be found. In antitrust damages actions, there will be 
no need that documents of which disclosure is sought are 
the only means to prove relevant facts; besides, parties will 
not be requested to prove the existence and describe ex 
36 Osti, Concorrenza e mercato, 2014, 293; Vincre, Rivista diritto processuale, 4-5/2015, 
1160; Giussani, AIDA, 1/2015, 25. References to the White Book and related debates in: 
Negri, Giurisdizione e amministrazione nella tutela della concorrenza. II. La tutela della 
concorrenza innanzi al giudice civile, Torino, 2012, 331.
37 See: Volpino, in Commentario al c.p.c., edited by Chiarloni, Torino, 2014, 185; Dittrich, 
Rivista diritto processuale, 3/2016, 539. Ce
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ante the precise content of documents.38 Indeed, Article 3, 
fully complying with the Directive, allows disclosure of 
entire “categories of evidence.” This is undeniably the 
most appreciable change to the pre-existing rules. The 
phrase “category of evidence” was previously unknown 
to Italian procedural law. Article  3 tries to define this 
concept by making use of the exact words of Recital 16 
of the Directive. The result is that Article 3.2 offers only 
a vague guidance and, inescapably, it leaves room to a 
substantial degree of judicial discretion in drafting the 
order.39 The judge will perform the task by applying the 
crucial test of proportionality (see infra) and by taking 
care to circumscribe as narrowly as possible the scope 
of the order in the light of all the circumstances of the 
case. Above all, the judge can only order the disclosure 
of “relevant” categories of proofs.
34. It is worth noticing that “relevance” of evidence the 
disclosure of which is sought under Article  3 plainly 
corresponds to “necessity” in Article  210 c.p.c. As a 
consequence, it is well accepted that documents to 
be disclosed under Article  3 have to bear reference to 
previously asserted facts. The requirement is precisely 
meant to prevent “fishing expeditions” in the strictest 
sense, that is to say, requests for disclosure of documents 
in order to search for new and previously unknown facts, 
potentially relevant to the case.40 
35.  Disclosure of entire “categories of evidence” is, of 
course, a welcome development if  compared to current 
practice, but in my opinion, probably not a revolution. 
It is true that courts have up to now adopted an overly 
cautious approach to Article 210 c.p.c. There have been, 
though, from time to time, episodes in which courts took 
a more generous stance towards the requirement of the 
precise identification of relevant documents. Article 3.2 
should, therefore, encourage those more generous 
attitudes.41 
36. It appears that courts will follow this somewhat more 
liberal attitude towards disclosure. It is noteworthy to 
remind that the Corte di cassazione has already shown 
a remarkably proactive attitude in the field of antitrust 
private enforcement, by fostering a broad interpretation 
of the provisions relating to the gathering of evidence 
38 Caiazzo, Italian Antitrust Review, 2/2017,108. Commenting on the Directive: Giussani, 
254; De Santis, 1503. 
39 See: Villa, Corriere giuridico, 4/2017, 444.
40 Giussani, 255; Finocchiaro, Diritto industriale, 3/2016, 237; Caiazzo, 108.
41 As a consequence, it can be reasonably expected that it will be now possible to obtain 
disclosure of  all the invoices relating to specified business relations, issued in a certain 
period of  time by company X, or the correspondence entertained in a defined time span 
between company X and a certain category of  customers (Vincre, 1160; Haasbeeck, in 
L’applicazione del diritto della concorrenza in Italia e in Europa, Benacchio-Carpagnano 
(ed.), 2015, Trento, 77). To the contrary, an order to disclose all the addressee’s accounting 
books and records is presumably still not admissible, outside special provisions such as Art. 
2711.1 c.c.
and the burden of proof.42 The Italian Supreme Court 
has thus clearly shown itself  to be willing and ready 
to take seriously the new rules on evidence gathering 
and the Directive’s goal of boosting antitrust private 
enforcement.
2. Plausibility of the claim
37. The party seeking disclosure has to lodge a reasoned 
request adducing facts and evidence reasonably available 
to the opposing party or to non-party and sufficient 
to support the plausibility of the claim (“fatti e prove 
ragionevolmente disponibili dalla controparte o dal terzo, 
sufficienti a sostenere la plausibilità della domanda”). 
This  is a requirement unknown to Article 210 c.p.c. 
To some extent, it recalls the similar requirement laid 
down by Article 6 of the Directive 2004/48/CE and the 
transposition thereof in Article 121 Legislative Decree No. 
30/2005.43 It has been, therefore, observed that, also with 
regard to antitrust claims, the threshold of plausibility of 
the action is the semi-plena probatio of  the relevant facts.44 
Such a threshold can be easily met in follow-on actions, 
where at least the existence of the infringement is certain; 
with regard to stand-alone actions, though, it is far more 
difficult to establish a prima facie case. It is, therefore, 
perhaps preferable to take the view that the judge shall 
reject the request for disclosure only when the claim or 
the defence is manifestly unfounded.45 At any rate, the 
claim cannot be said to be “plausible” and the request for 
disclosure shall be dismissed if  the initial description of 
the particulars of the claim is exceedingly generic. This, 
of course, leads one to wonder when an antitrust claim, 
in stand-alone actions, is sufficiently detailed. As already 
mentioned, Article 3 confirms the usual requirement that 
documents or categories of documents to be collected 
through disclosure orders are actually useful to prove 
facts already asserted by the parties. It follows from 
this that the plaintiff  should be already able to describe 
the essential features of the infringement in accordance 
with the fact-pleading standard. It remains nevertheless 
open to debate if  and to what extent the provision 
allows to slightly relax the current requirements of 
initial fact-pleading so that previously unknown details 
of infringements or damages can be detected through 
disclosure orders. Indeed, Article 3 does not address this 
crucial topic. The Directive itself  is not entirely clear, 
though Recital 14 hints to such a possibility. Describing 
the structural “information asymmetry” in competition 
cases, Recital 14 reads: “(…) strict legal requirements for 
claimants to assert in detail all the facts of their case at 
the beginning of an action and to proffer precisely specified 
items of supporting evidence can unduly impede the 
42 Corte di cassazione, civ., 4.6.2015, No. 1156, basing on the rationale behind the Directive, 
at the time not yet implemented; Corte d’appello, Milano, 7.1.2016 No.  9. Cass. No. 
1156/2015 also supported in the reasoning, albeit incidentally, the applicability of  
the Directive to different remedies, such as nullity. Unfortunately, Art. 3 only mentions 
damages actions based on European and/or national competition law, including the 
so-called consumers “class action” under Art. 140 bis Legislative Decree No. 20672005. 
43 Muscolo, Italian Antitrust Review, 2/2015, 57.
44 Muscolo, ibidem.
45 Giussani, 254. Ce
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effective exercise of the right to compensation guaranteed 
by the TFEU.” Scholars commenting on the Directive 
suggested that Article 5 should be construed in the light 
of Recital  14, allowing courts to be less demanding as 
to the initial fact-pleading standard.46 It remains quite 
uncertain whether courts will follow these indications.
3. Proportionality test
38. Article 3.3 entrusts the judge with the task of limiting 
the scope of disclosure to what is proportionate to the 
decision to be adopted. To that purpose, the judge takes 
into account: the strength of the claim or the defence, 
the scope and costs of the disclosure (especially as to 
non-parties), and finally the need to protect confidential 
information. This is apparently a new requirement, 
though it is true that civil courts have always acted as 
“gatekeepers” of disclosure. Unfortunately, Article  3.3 
just echoes the wording of the Directive and therefore 
does not help to overcome perplexities already raised 
by the latter. Doubts have arisen as to the issue of 
costs mainly. Pursuant to Article 210 c.p.c., the party 
making the request has to pay in advance all the costs of 
complying with the order of disclosure, though the order 
is not conditional upon payment. The final allocation of 
costs follows the “loser pays” rule and amounts paid in 
advance by the winner party are subject to restitution. 
Being so, it is difficult to understand how the issue of 
costs can interfere with the proportionality of the 
disclosure sought.47 According to Article 3.3, disclosure 
of confidential documents is not excluded: the judge 
has the power to limit the scope of the order and give 
practical directions aimed at reconciling access to proof 
and protection of confidential data. This kind of practical 
directions is certainly not unprecedented,48 though 
Article 3 states even more clearly that access to proof shall 
in principle prevail on the right of confidentiality. Besides, 
Article  3 for the first time provides a non-exhaustive 
list of judicial orders to protect confidentiality. The list 
echoes Recital  18, adding the judicial power to impose 
a “duty of secrecy.” Most of these measures are already 
well known in the Italian court practice, though mainly 
in patent infringement litigation.49 With reference to 
legal privilege, Article 3.6 confirms the “confidentiality” 
of communications between lawyers and their clients as 
currently provided for by national law. As a consequence, 
only communications between external lawyers and their 
clients are excluded from disclosure. Not surprisingly, 
hopes for the extension of the privilege to in-house 
counsels have been disappointed.50 
46 De Cristofaro, Int’l Lis, 3–4/2015, 123; Id., AIDA, 1/2015, 108, basing also on 
the aforementioned Supreme Court’s ruling; De Santis, 1503. On divergences and 
convergences concerning pleading standards between civil and common law, see: Dalla 
Bontà, Civil Procedure Review, Vol.  1, No.  3: 75–94, 2010. On the interplay between 
evidence gathering and information gathering: Negri, 340; Vincre, 1170. 
47 Giussani, 255; Vincre, 116. Cf.: Finocchiaro, 237.
48 See Art. 121.3 Lgs. Decree No. 30/2005, Art. 210.2 and 212 c.p.c; Dittrich, 596. 
49 For references and some critical assessments, see: Vincre, 1162.
50 Falce, Diritto industriale, 6/2016, 511
4. Penalties 
39. I will conclude by drawing attention to one of the most 
important changes in national disclosure rules. Up  to 
now, parties’ disobedience to disclosure orders simply 
allowed the judge to draw very weak evidential inference 
(Art. 116 c.p.c.). As for non-parties’ disobedience, the law 
was completely silent. As a consequence and following 
the traditional opinion, there was no remedy at all in 
case of refusal to comply with the judicial order. This 
situation has undergone intense criticism for a long time 
now, unfortunately without succeeding in prompting 
national legislature to take action. At least with respect 
to competition damages actions, Article  6 supplies 
national courts with a wide armoury of penalties, which 
are fully suitable to make disclosure orders more effective. 
This development has come as a welcome surprise. 
According to Article  6, both parties and non-parties 
who refuse to comply with disclosure orders are now 
subject to heavy financial fines.51 It is for the judge to 
determine the amount of fines within the minimum and 
maximum limits set out by the law (€15,000–150,000). 
The amount of fines aligns with that of the fines that 
the ICA can adopt pursuant to Article 14.5 DPR 287/90 
(€25,000–100,000). Notwithstanding the financial level 
is considerably high, there is the risk that the addressee 
finds it more profitable to pay and refuse to disclose. 
Therefore, parties are subject to an additional penalty: 
the judge can draw adverse evidential inferences from the 
refusal or failure to comply, meaning that the judge may 
deem the relevant facts to be proven. When the addressee 
of the disclosure order is a party to the proceedings, fines 
and adverse evidential inferences can be both applied at 
the same time. The unexpected improvements concerning 
penalties, combined with the already mentioned proactive 
attitude of the Corte di cassazione, suggests a moderate 
optimism on the effectiveness of disclosure orders in 
competition damages actions, at least with reference to 
follow-on cases.
M. N.
51 Pursuant to Art. 6.5 fines are issued also to the representatives of  companies; presumably 
this means that the penalties should apply to the representatives on joint and several basis 
with the represented party (Caiazzo, 111). Ce
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V. Netherlands
40. The central provision for disclosure of documents in 
general—not only for those in the hands of the parties—
is Article  843a Code of Civil Procedure, the so-called 
“exhibition obligation.” This provision was already part 
of our law before the implementation of the Directive. It 
is, as such, not restricted to matters of competition law. 
It is already applied widely. Under Article  843a Code 
of Civil Procedure, a party may demand inspection or 
copy at its cost of certain documents pertaining to a legal 
relationship to which he is a party. He must, however, 
demonstrate a legitimate interest in taking copies or 
inspection. He may demand this from the party that has 
the documents in its possession. This may, therefore, be 
a third party, in other words, a party that is not involved 
in the dispute. The demand may be made in proceedings 
that are already pending, but also in separate proceedings, 
for example in summary proceedings (kort geding).
41. The requirement of a legitimate interest means that just 
being interested is not sufficient. The petition must concern 
documents the inspection of which the petitioner has a 
direct and concrete interest in. The petitioner must present 
sufficient facts and circumstances that demonstrate this 
direct and concrete interest. The documents do not need 
to be decisive for the outcome of the case, but they must 
be relevant as evidence for the petitioner’s legal position. 
42. These requirements should cover the requirement of 
Article  5, paragraph  1, of the Directive of “a reasoned 
justification,” containing “reasonably available facts” and 
“evidence sufficient to support the plausibility of its claim for 
damages.” The Directive introduced a presumption that a 
cartel causes harm.52 So, arguably, no legitimate interest 
can exist as far as it concerns the existence of damage. 
Therefore, “plausibility of claim for damages” must mean 
something different, for example documents relevant to 
causation or the calculation or estimation of damages.
43. The limitation of the petition to certain documents 
requires the petitioner to identify the documents in 
his petition. The documents must at least be described 
in such a fashion that it is sufficiently clear what the 
petitioner is after and that the court may assess whether 
he has a legitimate interest. This does not require an exact 
description of the documents; for example: “all invoices 
relating to the sales of product X in the period of the 
infringement” will usually be sufficient. This requirement 
to identify the documents prevents fishing expeditions. 
“Documents” in the meaning of Article  843a Code of 
Civil Procedure has a broad meaning, and includes 
electronic data.
44.  These requirements of Article  843a Code of Civil 
Procedure mirror more or less the restrictions of Article 5, 
paragraph 2, Directive that the disclosure needs to be limited 
to “specified items” or “relevant categories of documents 
circumscribed as precisely and narrowly as possible.”
52  Article 17, para. 2, Directive, implemented as article 6:193l Civil Code.
45.  The legal relation to which the documents must 
pertain includes a wrongful act, which in its turn captures 
a claim for damages caused by an infringement of 
competition law. The petitioner must be a party to that 
relationship, but it is not required that the petitioner be 
a party to the document or the legal relationship that is 
captured in the document. A petitioner may, for example, 
require exhibition of a sales agreement between the 
infringer and a third party if  that is relevant for his claim 
for damages based on wrongful act (an infringement of 
competition law).
46.  The court will, if  necessary determine the fashion 
in which copies or inspection of the documents must be 
given.53 
47.  Article  843a, paragraph  3, Code of Civil Procedure 
provides that no exhibition may be required from anyone 
who is held to confidentiality due to his profession, if he 
has possession of the documents only in and because of his 
professional capacity. This aims to protect rights of privilege 
of lawyers, but also notaries (and probably less relevant for 
damages claims), medical doctors and the clergy.
48. The fourth paragraph of Article 843a Code of Civil 
Procedure makes an exception for “exhibition” if  there are 
weighty reasons or if  proper adjudication can reasonably 
be assumed to be ascertained without provision of the 
documents. 
49.  Article  845 Code of Civil Procedure makes an 
exception to this rule, or rather a restriction. Pursuant 
to Article 845 Code of Civil Procedure exhibition may 
only be refused in case of weighty reasons. So, even if  
it were clear that proper adjudication is also guaranteed 
without exhibition of the documents, they must still be 
provided if  the requirements of Article  843a Code of 
Civil Procedure are otherwise met. Apparently wanting 
to err on the side of caution, just as the Directive, the 
Explanatory Memorandum makes clear that the wish to 
prevent damages claims is not a weighty interest.54 The 
Netherlands did not implement with so many words the 
requirement of Article  5, paragraph  3, Directive that 
the disclosure must be “proportionate.” The tests in that 
regard—in particular (a) 
the extent to which a claim or defence is supported by 
available evidence and justify a request for disclosure; 
and (b) 
scope and cost—will need to take place in the context of 
the legitimate interest test.
50.  The protection of confidential information, which 
is part of the proportionality test under Article 5 of the 
Directive, will,55 under Dutch law, need to be captured by 
the weighty reasons test. 
53 Art. 843a, para. 2, Code of  Civil Procedure.
54 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 23, and Art. 5, para. 5, Directive.
55 Cf. Art. 5, para. 3, sub c, Directive. Ce
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51. The defendant to the petition or the party that has 
possession of the documents in question will need to 
make plausible that weighty reasons exist. Confidentiality 
will not quickly be accepted as a weighty reason. The 
interest that the truth is brought to light will most of 
the time override this interest. This is so, because the 
Dutch courts have other ways to protect confidential 
information. In their determination of the way in which 
exhibition must be given, they may, for example, appoint 
a third party that is under an obligation of confidentiality 
in order to look at the documents first and select what 
is really relevant.56 The court may impose obligations of 
confidentiality on the parties to the proceedings.57 The 
court may set a penalty on non-adherence to certain 
conditions for disclosure.58
52.  The claim or petition for exhibition must be filed 
against the party that controls the documents. This 
ensures that this party will have the opportunity to be 
heard.59
53.  Article  13, paragraph  2, Directive requires that 
disclosure be possible from the claim or from third 
parties of information that is relevant to proof pass-on. 
This particular provision was not implemented separately 
in the Implementation Act. Article  843a Code of Civil 
Procedure already provides for this possibility. It has 
indeed already been applied for that purpose.60 
54.  It is worth noting that a claim on the basis of 
Article 843a Code of Civil Procedure may be supported 
with the possibility of an attachment, if  the petitioner 
can demonstrate a risk that the documents will be lost 
otherwise.61 Such an attachment can be made prior 
to a claim or petition for exhibition, but the petitioner 
may, in that case, only inspect the documents that were 
attached if  the court allows exhibition on that claim or 
petition. Pending the decision on the claim or petition, 
the documents will be stored with an independent third 
party.
55. Although they are relevant to claims or petitions for 
disclosure from the parties also, for systematic reasons, I 
will discuss Articles 846 (that excludes access to leniency 
documents) and 847 (other information in relation to an 
investigation of the competition authorities) in the next 
topic (“Disclosure of evidence included in the file of a 
competition authority”).
F. K.
56 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 8.
57 Article 29 Code of  Civil Procedure.
58 Article 611 ff  Code of  Civil Procedure.
59 Art. 5, para. 7, Directive.
60 District Court The Hague, 21 September 2016, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2016:11305 (Shell / 
CDC III) (I acted for one of  the parties).
61 Cf. Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), 13 September 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9958, 
NJ 2014/455.
VI. United Kingdom
1. Introduction*
56. A disclaimer: With a few isolated remarks on Scots 
law and Northern Irish provisions, I will concentrate 
on English and Welsh law. This is not due to a lack of 
respect to Scots law (indeed, for me as a civilian-trained 
lawyer the mixed legal system that is Scots law has many 
attractive features) or to Northern Ireland, but for want 
of familiarity with these jurisdictions. 
57.  As many commentators had indicated before the 
national implementation, Article  5 of the Damages 
Directive did not require any extension of the already 
broad disclosure rules in England and Wales; on the 
contrary, they needed to be restricted in relation to the 
black and grey lists contained in Articles 6 and 7 of the 
Directive.62 
58.  Accordingly, in order to implement the rules 
on disclosure in the Damages Directive, the 2017 
Regulations63 merely refer to the relevant disclosure rules 
(para. 27 of the new Schedule 8A to the Competition 
Act 1998), introduce the restrictions made necessary by 
the grey and black lists (para. 28 to 30), and empower the 
courts in Northern Ireland to order disclosure from third 
parties (para. 31). English and Welsh courts had already 
been empowered to order disclosure of third parties in 
the Woolf Reforms.64 
59. The following paragraphs will therefore not contain 
anything new in terms of the implementation of the 
Damages Directive, but will outline the system of inter 
partes disclosure in England and Wales, first in the Civil 
Procedure Rules (for actions in the High Court) and then 
in the Competition Appeals Tribunal (CAT) Rules 2015, 
and will focus on issues that have arisen under these rules 
and which may also arise under the provisions of the 
Directive.
* This contribution is largely based on, and reproduces some sections of, F. Wagner-von 
Papp, Access to Evidence and Leniency Materials (February 18, 2016), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2733973.
62 For England and Wales see, e.g., F. Wagner-von Papp, Implementation of  the Damages 
Directive in England & Wales, On-Topic Implementation of  EU Directive 2014/104/UE, 
Concurrences No. 2-2015, reprinted in Concurrences 2017 English Edition, 23, para. 9 
to 17. In Scotland, the corresponding provisions are to be found in the Administration of  
Justice (Scotland) Act 1972 (inspection of  documents, etc.), 1972 c.59 (as amended). 
63 The Claims in respect of  Loss or Damage arising from Competition Infringements 
(Competition Act  1998 and Other Enactments (Amendment)) Regulations  2017, 
Statutory Instrument 2017 No. 385.
64 See Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) 31.17. English law before the Woolf  reforms did not 
allow for disclosure requests addressed to others than the parties to an action. Information 
from third parties could only be obtained under witness summons, which were only 
available under more restrictive conditions. This was the difference that had caused 
friction between the US and the UK, for example, in the Westinghouse case. Rio Tinto v. 
Westinghouse [1978] All ER 434, 440–1. Ce
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2. CPR
60. For proceedings in the High Court in England and 
Wales, the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) provide in 
Part 31 for disclosure. 
61. “Standard disclosure” under CPR 31.6 now provides 
for disclosure of:
“(a) the documents on which [the party] relies; and 
(b) the documents which –
(i) adversely affect his own case;
(ii) adversely affect another party’s case; or
(iii) support another party’s case; and
(c) the documents which he is required to disclose 
by a relevant practice direction.”65 
62. The court may, however, still order disclosure of 
documents that satisfy the broader Peruvian Guano 
test but exceed the narrower bounds of CPR  31.6, or 
make any other order it deems appropriate, at any case 
management conference.66 Under the menu option, 
possible orders range from no disclosure at all to the 
full Peruvian Guano disclosure and similarly extensive 
options, such as the “key to the warehouse orders,” where 
the parties grant access to the other party to search 
for relevant documents themselves.67 The revised CPR 
rule  31.5(7) now incorporates this menu of possible 
disclosure orders.68
63. Disclosure usually takes place after fact pleading in 
the damages action.69 One question has been how specific 
the facts have to be pleaded in competition cases before 
disclosure can be ordered. Article  5 of the Damages 
Directive requires that the reasoned justification contain 
“reasonably available facts and evidence sufficient to 
support the plausibility of its claim.” This raises the 
question how the court should proceed if  no facts that 
would be sufficient to support the plausibility of the 
claim are reasonably available to the claimant. English 
courts have been relatively generous to claimants, at 
least in cartel cases: “In a case involving an allegation 
65 CPR 31.6. 
66 CPR Rule  31.5(7) (in the post Jackson review version). For the Peruvian Guano test 
see Compagnie Financière du Pacifique v. Peruvian Guano Co (1882) 11 QBD  55, 63, 
interpreting the test under the Rules of  the Supreme Court (RSC) (1875) Order. I rule 12, 
subsequently RSC (1965) Order 24.
67 On the menu option see R. Jackson, Review of  Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report 
(December 2009) (The Stationery Office 2010) 275–277.
68 Introduced by Rule  11 of  the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules  2013, 
SI  2013/262, in force since 1 April 2013. See also Lord Justice Jackson’s paper for 
the Civil Justice Council Conference on 21st March 2014, http://www.judiciary.
gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/CJC/ Publications/CJC+papers/
Jackson+LJ+paper+CJC+conference+21+March+2014. pdf, para  3.13; idem, 
Controlling the Costs of  Disclosure, Seventh Lecture in the Implementation Programme, 
The Lexisnexis Conference on Avoiding and Resolving Construction Disputes, para. 4.7 
and 4.8 (24 November 2011), http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/
Documents/Speeches/ controlling-costs-disclosure.pdf.
69 The exception is pre-action disclosure under CPR  31.16 (introduced by the Woolf  
Reforms), which is granted only under restrictive conditions (see the Hutchinson 3G case 
cited below). 
that a secret cartel has operated (…) there is an inevitable 
tension in domestic procedural law between the impulse to 
ensure that claims are fully and clearly pleaded so that a 
defendant can know with some exactitude what case he has 
to meet (and also so that disclosure obligations can be fully 
understood, expert witnesses given clear instructions and so 
on), on the one hand, and on the other the impulse to ensure 
that justice is done and a claimant is not prevented by overly 
strict and demanding rules of pleading from introducing a 
claim which may prove to be properly made out at trial, 
but which will be shut out by the law of limitation if the 
claimant is to be forced to wait until he has full particulars 
before launching a claim.”70 The court in Nokia concluded 
that “the balance is to be struck by allowing a measure 
of generosity in favour of a claimant.”71 However, this 
generosity is not unbounded. In Hutchinson 3G Ltd v. 
O2 (UK),72 the court refused disclosure in a pre-action 
disclosure setting.73 
64. With regard to the question if  a parent has “control” 
over evidence that is located at a subsidiary, English 
courts have settled for the Lonrho test that requires 
a “presently enforceable right to possession,” which a 
parent may or may not have against its subsidiary, 
depending on the circumstances.74 The mere possibility 
to obtain the consent of the subsidiary was held to be 
insufficient to constitute control. The starting point is 
the definition of “control” in the CPR, which comprises 
physical possession, a right to possession, or a right to 
inspect or take copies, in the past or present.75 The CAT 
Rules  2015 define control in the same way.76 Lonrho v. 
Shell continues to inform the test under the CPR (and 
presumably the CAT rules  2015). In Schlumberger, a 
case in which one company already had obtained the 
consent of other companies in the same corporate group 
to inspect documents, this pre-existing access was held 
to be sufficient to constitute “control.”77 Similarly, the 
court of appeal held in North Shore that where there is an 
existing arrangement between the party and the person 
in possession that is in substance akin to agency, the 
70 Nokia Corporation v. AU Optronics Corporation [2012] EWHC 731 (Ch) [62], cited with 
approval in Bord Na Mona Horticultural Ltd & Anr v. British Polythene Industries Plc 
[2012] EWHC 3346 (Comm) [30], in turn cited with approval in Emerald Supplies Ltd v. 
British Airways plc & Ors [2014] EWHC 3514 (Ch) [50].
71 Nokia Corporation v. AU Optronics Corporation [2012] EWHC 731 (Ch) [67].
72 Hutchinson 3G Ltd v. O2 (UK) Ltd and others [2008] EWHC  55 Comm, [2008] 
UKCLR 83.
73 The decision was largely based on the argument that pre-action disclosure is the exception 
and not the norm. However, it is unlikely that, on the facts of  Hutchinson 3G, the main 
action could be pleaded with sufficient specificity without pre-action disclosure, even 
under the relaxed standards used in Nokia.
74 Lonrho v. Shell Petroleum [1980] 1 WLR 627, 633–7, albeit under RSC Order 24 and in 
a slightly more complex scenario than usual for parent-subsidiary relationships; see also 
the discussion in M. Brealey and N. Green, Competition Litigation — UK Practice and 
Procedure (Oxford University Press 2010), para 9.25–9.30.
75 CPR 31.8(2).
76 CAT Rules 2015, Rule 60(4). 
77 Schlumberger Holdings Ltd v. Electromagnetic Geoservices [2008] EWHC  56 (Pat) 
[8]–[21]. Ce
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“principal” can be deemed to be in “control.”78 In Ardila 
Investments, Mr. Justice Males summarised the position 
as follows: “First, it remains the position that a parent 
company does not merely by virtue of being a 100% parent 
have control over the documents of its subsidiaries. Second, 
an expectation that the subsidiary will in practice comply 
with requests made by the parent is not enough to amount 
to control. Third, in such circumstances (…) there is no 
obligation even to make the request, although it may, in 
some circumstances, be legitimate to draw inferences if the 
party to the litigation declines to make sensible requests. 
(…) Fourth, however, a party may have sufficient practical 
control (…) if there is evidence of the parent already 
having had unfettered access to the subsidiary’s documents 
or if there is material from which the court can conclude 
that there is some understanding or arrangement by which 
the parent has the right to achieve such access.”79 
65.  Another question in relation to “control” that has 
come up in the United States—though, to my knowledge 
not yet in the UK—is whether information on employees’ 
devices used under a “bring-your-own-device” policy is 
in the control of the undertaking.80 In the context of 
inspections, the Commission controversially claims 
the right to search such devices under Article  20(4) 
of Regulation (EC) No.  1/2003.81 This view arguably 
implies that the undertaking has control over these 
communications (although the same interpretation 
in the different contexts is not logically necessary). 
The  proportionality analysis in these cases would have 
to take into account the employee’s privacy and data 
protection issues, but there are indications that the 
protection under the ECHR may not be very strong.82
66.  Eventually, these questions about “control” are 
probably in most cases not of crucial importance, given 
that the court (both under English law83 and under the 
Directive) may also order disclosure from non-parties. 
However, it may make a difference in international 
cartel cases where the subsidiary is not within the court’s 
78 North Shore Ventures Ltd v. Anstead Holdings Inc [2012] EWCA Civ  11 [26]–[40]. The 
judgment indicates that the definition of  control in CPR  31.8 may not, in fact, be 
exhaustive, ibid. [40].
79 Ardila Investments NV v. ENRC NV v. Zamin Ferrous Ltd, [2015] EWHC 3761 (Comm) 
[13], [14]. The court pointed out in this case that the formula of  “practical control” used 
in Global Energy Horizons Corporation v. Gray [2014] EWHC 2925 (Ch) [50] should be 
treated with care, because it could imply that any practical control was sufficient, whereas 
the existing precedent made clear that only an existing arrangement that allowed access, 
rather than the possibility to obtain access in the future, was enough for present “control.” 
Ardila at [12]. 
80 D. Richter, “Bring Your Own Device” Programs: Employer Control over Employee Devices 
in the Mobile E-Discovery Age, (2015) 82 Tennessee Law Review 443–459.
81 Explanatory Note on Commission Inspections pursuant to Article 20(4) of  Council 
Regulation No 1/2003 (revised 11 September 2015), point  10, http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/antitrust/legislation/explanatory_note.pdf. For a critical assessment 
see S. Kinsella, The EU Commission publishes an explanatory note on its powers of  
investigation, 11 September 2015, e-Competitions Bulletin (September 2015), Art 
No. 76175. 
82 See, by analogy, Bărbulescu v. Romania App No. 61496/08 (ECHR, 12 January 2016), 
where, however, the employer did not refer to the content of  private messages, but only on 
the frequency of  private use.
83 CPR 31.17.
jurisdiction (as was the case in the non-competition case 
Schlumberger). Also, the proportionality analysis may be 
affected by the question whether the disclosure is inter 
partes or against a non-party. 
67. With regards to “proportionality,” the English legal 
system has attempted to contain the costs for disclosure 
through the Woolf and Jackson reforms. The Woolf 
reforms sought to limit disclosure by subjecting it to the 
“overriding objective” of dealing “with cases justly and at 
proportionate cost.”84 However, it is widely acknowledged 
that the Woolf reforms did not fully achieve their 
intended effect, and the problem of disproportionate 
disclosure costs persisted in legal practice.85 While the 
costs of disclosure will, of course, vary widely depending 
on the scope of the disclosure and circumstances of the 
case, the costs of standard disclosure in competition 
cases are currently in the order of magnitude of, and may 
exceed, £1m–£2m.86
68. The Jackson review found disproportionate disclosure 
costs in particular in multitrack and other “high stakes” 
cases,87 a category that de facto comprises all substantial 
competition cases. Lord Justice Jackson proposed 
that the CPR provide for a “menu option,” a range of 
options for disclosure orders which the court may choose 
depending on what it considers appropriate taking the 
overriding objective into account, a position that was 
adopted in CPR 31.5(7). It remains to be seen whether 
courts will use this opportunity to limit disclosure to a 
greater degree than the powers they already had under 
RSC (1965) Order  24 or the increased opportunities 
to intervene after the Woolf reforms. There are some 
indications that courts in competition cases make use of 
the new powers to achieve more targeted and “phased” 
disclosure.88
84 CPR Rule 1.1(1), as amended by Rule 4 of  the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2013, 
SI 2013/262. In the original CPR 1998, the proportionality criterion was contained in 
Rule 1.1(2).
85 Nichia Corp v. Argos Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ  741, [2007] Business Law Review  1753 
[36]–[55], especially [44], in which Jacob L. J. notes: “Following the Woolf  reforms, and 
notwithstanding their changes, practitioners (and I think not just in patent actions) carried 
on much as they did before. The cost of  patent and large commercial actions did not reduce: 
if  anything it went up.” Similarly, P. Matthews and H. M. Malek (Disclosure 4th edition 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2012), para 1.03) note that the “concerns over the cost and 
complexity of  the disclosure continue to be very real” even after the Woolf  reforms (see 
also ibid. para  1.04, 1.33); M.  Brealey and N.  Green, Competition Litigation — UK 
Practice and Procedure (Oxford University Press 2010) para 9.21 (“In practice, however, 
the reduced obligation of  disclosure has not had anything like the effect that might have been 
contemplated in 1999”). 
86 In Infederation Ltd v. Google Inc et al. [2013] EWHC  2295 (Ch) para. 23, Google’s 
solicitors estimated its costs for standard disclosure to be more than £2m. In Hutchinson 
3G Ltd v. O2 (UK) Ltd and ors, [2008] EWHC 55 Comm, [2008] UKCLR 83 [36] and 
[60] the court noted that the costs of  the pre-action disclosure sought by the applicant in 
that case, with relatively broad categories of  documents covering a seven-year time period, 
would be in the order of  magnitude of  £1m. 
87 “High stakes” cases included cases where the amount in controversy was more than £1m.
88 Infederation Ltd v. Google Inc et al. [2013] EWHC 2295 (Ch), [2014] 1 CMLR 13 [37]–[38] 
(limiting Google’s disclosure to the material documents within the category of  35,000 
documents already disclosed to the European Commission, and deferring disclosure on 
one of  the five allegations; see also [33]–[36], achieving further efficiencies through case 
management, specifically by bi-/trifurcating the trial on the issues of  abuse on the one 
hand, and dominant position and quantum of  damages on the other). Ce
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3. CAT Rules 2015
69. Where a claimant brings a stand-alone or follow-on 
claim under the amended s.  47A of the Competition 
Act 1998 in the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT)—
which is increasingly likely after the Consumer Rights 
Act has done away with many of the issues that prevented 
or disincentivised claimants from bringing their actions 
in the CAT—the CAT may “at any point give directions 
as to how disclosure is to be given,” including “what 
searches are to be undertaken, of where, for what, in respect 
of which time periods (…) and the extent of any search 
for electronically stored documents.”89 As the CAT has 
explained in its Guide to Proceedings90 this means that 
disclosure in the CAT is not automatic. It needs to be 
ordered by the tribunal, usually upon a request by a party 
to the proceedings. The tribunal must be satisfied that the 
disclosure sought is necessary, relevant and proportionate 
to determine the issues before it.91
70.  There are few explicit limitations on the CAT’s 
discretion with regard to the scope of disclosure. The 
discretion is limited by the CAT Rules’ “governing 
principles” which are parallel to the CPR’s “overriding 
objectives,” and provide that the CAT “shall seek to ensure 
that each case is dealt with justly and at proportionate 
cost.”92 In the context of disclosure, the CAT shall have 
regard to “the need to limit disclosure to that which is 
necessary to deal with the case justly” in addition to the 
governing principles.93 The CAT further decided that 
the “object of a disclosure application [under the CAT 
Rules 2003] is to obtain production of specified documents. 
Accordingly, the application must specifically identify the 
documents sought; it must not be of a fishing or speculative 
nature.”94 It should be noted, however, that even the 2003 
Rules provided for orders for classes of documents to 
be disclosed, and that the 2015 Rules have, if  anything, 
expanded the CAT’s discretion.
89 Rule 60(3) of  the CAT Rules 2015.
90 Tribunal’s Guide to Proceedings (2015), para. 5.86. See also Mr. Justice Roth’s 
Introduction to the CAT Practice Direction Relating to Disclosure and Inspection of  
Evidence in Claims Made Pursuant to Parts 4 and 5 of  the Competition Appeal Tribunal 
Rules 2015 of  14 March 2017; and compare already the 2003 CAT Rules, SI 1372/2003.
91 Claymore Dairies Ltd and ors v. OFT (Recovery and Inspection) [2004] CAT  16 [113]; 
followed in Albion Water Ltd and another v. Water Services Regulation Authority [2008] 
CAT 3 [29], [42], [43].
92 Compare Rule 4 of  the CAT Rules 2015 with CPR 1.1. The CAT had already applied the 
same standard under the CAT Rules 2003 in analogy to the CPR’s overriding objectives: 
HCA International Ltd v. CMA, [2014] CAT 11 [16] (the case concerned the disclosure 
of  raw data and specifics of  the econometric model used, but in the context of  the review 
of  a decision by a competition authority; as it turned out, there were indeed mistakes in 
the CMA’s statistical analysis, see the summary of  facts in HCA International Ltd v. CMA 
[2015] EWCA Civ 492). 
93 Rule 60(2)(b) of  the CAT Rules 2015. The CAT’s duty is not particularly strict: Rule 60(2) 
makes this duty subject to the CAT’s directions under Rule 60(3) and to the proviso “unless 
the Tribunal otherwise thinks fit.” 
94 Albion Water Ltd and another v. Water Services Regulation Authority [2008] CAT 3 [41].
71.  The CAT Rules  2015 provide, again in parallel to 
the CPR, for disclosure before proceedings start and for 
non-party disclosure.95 
72. In the case of collective proceedings and settlements, 
the CAT has the general powers to order disclosure 
described above. Rule 89 adds that the CAT may order 
disclosure to be given “by any party (...) to any other 
party; by the class representative to any or all represented 
persons; and by any represented person to any other 
represented person (including a person within a different 
sub-class), the class representative or the defendant.”
73. The CAT had already applied a proportionality test 
to disclosure under the 2003 Rules. The CAT Rules 2015 
specify that the governing principle of “dealing with a 
case justly and at proportionate cost includes, so far as is 
practicable (...) (c) dealing with the case in ways which are 
proportionate (i) to the amount of money involved; (ii) to 
the importance of the case; (iii) to the complexity of the 
issues; and (iv) to the financial position of each party.”96 
The CAT Practice Direction Relating to Disclosure and 
Inspection of Evidence in Claims Made Pursuant to Parts 
4 and 5 of the Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 
of 14 March 2017 (the “PD”) add that the specification of 
the evidence must be as “precise and narrow as possible 
on the basis of a reasoned justification”, and that the 
CAT will limit disclosure or inspection to that which is 
proportionate, which is to be determined by taking the 
interests of all parties and third parties concerned and 
by taking into account the factors listed in Article 5(3) of 
the Damages Directive (2.2 –2.4 of the PD). 
95 Rules 62, 63 of  the CAT Rules 2015; cf. CPR 31.16 and 31.17. For an application for 
non-party disclosure under the CAT Rules  2003 cf. Deutsche Bahn and ors v. Morgan 
Crucible Company and ors [2014] CAT 15 (order of  9 September 2014).
96 Rule  4(2)(c) of  the CAT Rules  2015. The CAT had already applied these factors (and 
the others mentioned in Rule 4(2) of  the CAT Rules 2015) in its analysis under the CAT 
Rules 2003 by applying the CPR’s overriding objectives by analogy: HCA International Ltd 
v. CMA, [2014] CAT 11 [16]. Ce
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4. Confidential Information
74.  Common law jurisdictions have no general bar 
against the disclosure of  confidential information,97 
and have developed the corresponding safeguards to 
protect such information by redaction of  documents 
or containing confidential information in confidentiality 
rings.98
75. One practically important question that has 
already occupied the English courts is to what extent 
disclosure of confidential versions of the Commission’s 
infringement decision (redacted only for leniency 
statements and legal professional privilege) can be 
ordered, provided a confidentiality ring is established.99 
It can take the Commission a long time to come up with a 
non-confidential version of the decision. The Commission 
is in a difficult situation.100 On the one hand, the Court of 
Justice’s Pilkington decision prohibits the publication of a 
non-confidential version where undertakings have raised 
claims of confidentiality that are not yet fully resolved.101 
On the other hand, the decision in Schenker obligates the 
Commission to publish a meaningful non-confidential 
version within a reasonable time, where necessary 
excluding those passages that are still in contention.102 
76. In the English High Court, Mr Justice Peter Smith 
had vented his frustration with the Commission’s delay 
in providing a meaningful non-confidential version and 
eventually ordered disclosure of a minimally redacted 
confidential version into a confidentiality ring. This 
order was appealed by parties that were mentioned in 
the Commission decision, but to whom the Commission 
decision had not been addressed, so that they were 
97   See generally Lord Wilberforce’s speech in Nassé v Science Research Council 
[1979] UKHL 9, [1980] AC 1028. In the competition law context: MTV Europe v BMG 
Records (UK) Ltd [1998] EWCA Civ 430; for the CAT: Albion Water Ltd and another v 
Water Services Regulation Authority [2008] CAT 3 [61]; Aberdeen Journals v DGFT [2003] 
CAT 14; Umbro v OFT [2004] CAT 3. See also M.  Brealey and N.  Green, Competition 
Litigation — UK Practice and Procedure (Oxford University Press 2010) paras 9.47–9.52.
98 See CAT Rules 2015, Rule 53(2)(h) (CAT may give directions to create a confidentiality 
ring). In the High Court, see, eg, National Grid Electricity Transmission plc v ABB and 
others [2012] EWHC 869 (Ch) [58] (lifting the redaction of  a ‘number of, but by no means 
all’ passages; see also the order of  Roth J of  11 July 2011, establishing a confidentiality 
ring in this case); see also IPCom GmbH & Co KG v HTC and others [2013] EWHC 2880 
(Ch) [47]–[49], where Roth J imposed a ‘particularly tight confidentiality club’ (excluding, 
among others, a German lawyer) on the application of  the non-parties Qualcomm and 
Intel, whose source code was in question, under CPR Rule 40.9. For the practice in the 
CAT in appeal proceedings, see, eg, National Grid plc v Gas and Electricity Market Authority, 
CAT Order of  23 May 2008 in Case 1099/1/2/08 (the confidentiality ring was varied in 
several subsequent orders); Talktalk Telecom Group plc v British Telecommunications plc, 
Ofcom v Sky UK Ltd [2015] CAT 13 [9]–[17]; AC Nielsen Company Ltd v Competition 
and Markets Authority and Information Resources, Inc [2014] CAT 13 [14]–[22] (on the 
treatment of  disclosed confidential information after proceedings have come to an end; 
noting, inter alia, that while ‘the CPR does not apply to proceedings in the Tribunal [...] 
the Tribunal Rules are based on the same general philosophy as the CPR’, ibid [16]; see also 
the confidentiality ring order of  15 May 2014 in that case).
99 Air Canada and ors v Emerald Supplies [2015] EWCA Civ 1024.
100 For a discussion see M Kellerbauer, The Recent Case Law on the Disclosure of  
Information Regarding EU Competition Law Infringements to Private Damages 
Claimants, European Competition Law Review 35 (2014), 56–62.
101 Case C-278/13 p(R) Commission v Pilkington ECLI:EU:C:2013:558.
102 Case T-534/11 Schenker AG v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2014:854. On the other hand, 
Case T-345/12 Akzo Nobel v Commission gives the Commission latitude in publishing a 
more detailed non-confidential version of  the decision that is helpful to private claimants 
(here: CDC before the Landgericht Dortmund). 
entitled to Pergan protection.103 The Court of Appeal 
set aside the Judge’s order on the basis that Pergan 
protection was absolute and not sufficiently safeguarded 
by confining the disclosure to the confidentiality ring.104 
In particular, the Court was of the view that other 
claimants could likewise initiate damages actions, that 
the claimants’ undertakings did not prevent use of the 
information obtained in order to expand the scope of 
their claims, and that the members of the confidentiality 
ring would inevitably be influenced by their knowledge in 
future actions.105 
5. Clarifications
77. In addition to disclosure of documents, CPR Part 18 
empowers the court to order a party to clarify matters 
or provide further information. Requests by the first 
party for such an order against the second party should 
be “concise and strictly confined to matters which are 
reasonably necessary and proportionate to enable the first 
party to prepare his own case or to understand the case he 
has to meet.”106 The second party may object that such 
a request “can only be complied with at disproportionate 
expense,” and explain why that is the case.107 Unless the 
court allocates costs differently in its order, costs lie 
where they fall.108
78. In National Grid, Mr. Justice Roth ruled that requests 
for further information were more efficiently dealt 
with after document disclosure had taken place and 
witness statements had been prepared.109 However, after 
disclosure had taken place, the information asymmetry in 
cartel cases meant that in these cases it was particularly 
appropriate to have the infringers provide further 
information under CPR Part 18 in addition to the, often 
deliberately, “opaque and cryptic” documents.110 Similar 
to CPR Part 18, the CAT may give directions “requiring 
clarification of any matter in dispute or additional 
information in relation to any such matter.”111
F. W.-v. P. n
103 See Case T-474/04 Pergan Hilfsstoffe für industrielle Prozesse GmbH v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2007:306 [2007] ECR II-4225.
104 Air Canada and ors v Emerald Supplies [2015] EWCA Civ 1024. The Court also argued, 
in the alternative, that even if  Pergan protection were not absolute, it would at any rate 
not be possible to exercise discretion such that disclosure of  the confidential decision could 
be made even into the confines of  the confidentiality ring.
105 Ibid [84]. 
106 Practice Direction 18 — Further Information (“PD 18”), para. 1.2. 
107 PD 18 para. 4.2(2).
108 CPR Rule 44.10 and PD 18 para. 5.8(2).
109 National Grid v. ABB & ors [2012] EWHC 869 (Ch) [73]–[79].
110 National Grid v. ABB & ors [2014] [EWHC] 1555 (Ch), 2014 WL 1220027 [40].
111 CAT Rules 2015, Rule 53(2)(d). Ce
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